Sir, -- I was one of the passengers on board the ship Douro, and reached England on Friday evening. It was suggested at Corunna that I should, on arrival, supply a statement of the facts to the papers, both as the result of my personal knowledge and from information gleaned from others, I note, however, that I have been practically forestalled in this duty by the narratives of other survivors, who arrived a day earlier, and, as I find the accounts already published to be substantially accurate in leading details, I refrain from adding to the list of merely personal experiences.

It appears to me, however, that something remains to be said as to the cause of the collision and the state of things prevailing on board the ship when it occurred, and in these matters I think my additional dayís stay in Corunna has afforded me some advantages in forming a judgement.

So far as I could gather, no passenger actually witnessed the collision, and I suspect that, with the exception of those actually navigating the vessel, few, if any, were on deck at the time. The captain was not on duty (he had been ailing for some days), and the watch was that of the chief officer and fourth officer. The Spanish steamer had been seen for some time. The night was so clear that the Finisterre light, though nearly 40 miles distant, was visible, and one of the passengers has told me that on going below some few minutes before the mishap he had jocularly remarked to a bystander, '2 to 1 on a collision'. It seems, too, that both vessels were properly furnished with lights. The conclusion is inevitable. The collision was the result, not of accident, but of error of judgement on one or both sides.

So far it seems rather to have been assumed that the Spanish vessel was in default, and there is a statement given apparently on the authority of Mr. Thompson, that she suddenly changed her course and thus occasioned the mischief. Such was, I believe, the original impression on board, but I have not found it corroborated. Mr. Thompson was at the time (as he himself says) 'below', and, therefore, saw nothing. It is further urged in support of this theory that the Spanish captain had just been on his trial for running down a ship, but it appears that he was acquitted, and at the time of our collision he was not in charge of his vessel, but asleep.

Whether, however, there was contributory negligence on the part of the Spaniard or not, I fear there can be no doubt that there was a fault of judgement (to say the least) on the part of those navigating the Douro. I reach this conclusion, not as a matter of personal opinion, but as a result of conversations with those well qualified to judge. I quote from the captain of the Hidalgo, from such of our own sailors as I met with, and from the captain of John Pender, lying in Corunna Harbour (from whom, I may perhaps, be allowed to say in passing, many of us received the greatest possible kindness and hospitality on arrival in that port). I heard but one opinion expressed, and that opinion was adverse to our management. It seems that we neglected the 'rule of the road'. We were behind time, and there would naturally be a reluctance to alter our course. Probably our rate of speed was over-estimated; that of the stranger under-rated. Possibly the setting of the square sail on board our ship (just then in hand) disturbed calculations. Whatever the cause, and however extenuating the circumstances, the facts remains that on board a first-class steamer, carrying the mails, and capable of holding, perhaps, some 300 persons, there was a want of care, attention, or ability, which is much more regretted, and must be far from assuring to the public.

I now pass to a consideration of the state of things which on board the Douro existed at the time of, or followed, the collision. On this point the statement already published relieve me of the necessity of being specific. One fact is prominently striking -- viz, the absence of the 'right man in the right place', and of the 'right thing in the right place'. The crew do not know their boats. They find no tools to hand. The davits do not work. Boats, when at last launched, cannot be cut adrift. When dispatched they are found to be rudderless, compassless, un-provisioned, un-commanded. And what would have become of us but for circumstances of specific and almost miraculous good fortune, I shudder to think. Had the accident occurred ten minutes later (when the shipís lights would have been put out); had it occurred an hour or two later (when a heavy squall came on); but for a full moon and no intervening clouds; and last and chiefly, but for a steamer dropped from the clouds for the express purpose of picking us up, I think the story of the Douro would only have been told by the empty boats and wreckage which marked the spot on the following morning.

The following conclusions suggest themselves ; -- (1) That at stated periods -- ???, once a month -- launching apparatus should be tested, and all tools and implements seen to be in their place and in working order. (2) That with equal regularity (so far as circumstances admit) launching drill should be practised. (3) That every man coming on board a ship (passengers included) should be assigned to his boat. (4) That when once the command to lower boats has been given the officer attached to each boat should superintend the entire management and should leave the ship with her.

I hope that I have said nothing calculated to give pain to the relatives and friends of any of the officers who have died so nobly at their posts. My object has been, not to find fault or blame, but rather to draw a lesson for the future from the experience of the past -- a lesson which, as I sincerely trust, will not be thrown away or neglected.

Apologizing for the length of these remarks,
I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
KENRICK PECK

Read the next news report The Loss of the Douro - Wednesday, April 12, 1882

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